Digital feudalism, the role of the state, and the rewiring of society: A framework for India AI mapping | News explained

But behind these confusing headlines lie deeper questions about how to interpret the meaning of the AI ​​revolution and its impact on world order.

Three books by Yanis Varoufakis, Alex Karp, and the late diplomat Henry Kissinger offer very different answers, and between them pointers to the path forward for India.

Former Greek finance minister Varoufakis has warned that we are entering an era of “digital feudalism”. Karp, head of Palantir, argues that democracies need to leverage technology to survive intensifying geopolitical competition. And in his last book, Kissinger suggested that AI could change humanity’s relationship to knowledge and power itself.

In Technofeudalism: What Killed Capitalism, Varoufakis challenges the assumption that AI is ushering in a more advanced form of capitalism. He argues instead that the rise of digital platforms signals a regression from capitalism. These platforms have replaced competitive markets with privately managed digital assets, he says. Humanity is being reduced to digital serfdom, with platform owners extracting “rent” from online activity in the same way that feudal lords extract rent from land.

For an emerging power like India, Varoufakis’ paper raises uncomfortable questions. Can digital sovereignty be protected in a world where global platforms are overwhelmingly based in just two countries, the United States and China? Can democratic India live with digital feudalism? Whether we accept the term “techno-feudalism” or not, Varoufakis forces us to confront the concentration of digital power and the political consequences of its exercise.

If Varoufakis sees danger in corporate dominance, Alex Karp sees danger in strategic complacency. In The Technological Republic, Karp criticizes Silicon Valley’s deliberate distancing from the state and its insistence on consumer-oriented innovation. He argues that technology companies need to rediscover a sense of national purpose and collaborate with governments. He cites the Manhattan Project and the Internet as examples of how partnerships between states and technology once shaped the world order by ushering in the atomic age and global digital connectivity.

Karp argues that in a world of increasing competition with China, technological development is inseparable from national security for liberal democracies. States that fail to integrate technological innovation into their strategies risk losing influence or worse, he warns.

Mr. Karp’s argument is sure to resonate in India, which led the pursuit of advanced technology as a “developmental nation” after independence. But Delhi has been steadily losing ground due to its long-standing dependence on state-run technology monopolies and its reluctance to allow private capital to play a central role in technology development.

Delhi now appears poised to correct its course, albeit tentatively. However, we still have a long way to go before we can fully trust the private sector’s instincts to drive innovation. Meanwhile, India’s technology entrepreneurs are only just beginning to understand the magnitude of the opportunity before them.

In The Age of AI: And Our Human Future, published just before Kissinger’s death, Henry Kissinger, Eric Schmitt, and Daniel Huttenlocker argue that AI is a “third way of knowing” distinct from faith and reason.

AI systems detect patterns and generate insights without relying on human-designed theories or causal explanations. This challenges long-held assumptions about human special talents for reasoning, knowledge generation, and its application.

They argue that AI is not just a technological advance, but a civilizational break. The authors argue that to maintain human agency and global stability, society needs to consciously shape the role of AI, rather than allowing it to evolve unchecked.

For India, the stakes are unusually high. India’s central goal as a “catch-up nation” is to close the gap with developed countries in terms of power and prosperity. Delhi sees AI as a historic opportunity to accelerate growth, expand national capabilities, and leapfrog the technological ladder that developed countries have spent decades building.

But India must also navigate the tensions between regulation and innovation, safety and development. So far, Delhi has not copied Europe’s heavily regulated approach or embraced President Trump’s model of letting tech capital develop AI without any constraints.

India is trying to create a middle path, one that is easier said than done but harder to draw in actual policy-making.

This balancing act will shape the trajectory of AI in India in the coming decades. The choices Delhi makes in finding the right balance between the state and capital, and between international cooperation and the development of sovereign capacity, will determine whether India can leverage AI for national renewal or whether the inhibitions of past policies allow the country to move toward suboptimal outcomes.

C Raja Mohan is a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express. He is also affiliated with the Motwani Jadeja Institute of American Studies, Jindal Global University, and the Strategic Defense Research Council.