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sandra joyleman University of Richmond

Nearly 1.5 million Syrian refugees have voluntarily returned to their home countries in the past year.

This staggering figure represents almost a quarter of Syrians who fled fighting and lived abroad during the 13-year civil war. This is also an alarmingly rapid pace for a country where security continues to deteriorate across a wide area.

The scale and speed of these returns since the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's brutal regime on December 8, 2024, raises important questions: Why are so many Syrians returning, and will these returns continue? Also, what kind of state will it return to?

As an expert on property rights and post-conflict return migration, I have observed a massive surge in refugee returns to Syria throughout 2024. A combination of push and pull factors are driving this trend, while widespread property destruction during the brutal civil war remains an ongoing barrier to resettlement.

Where are the Syrian refugees?

Syria's civil war had been going on for more than a decade before a rebel coalition led by the Sunni Islamic group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham overthrew Assad. What began in 2011 as part of the Arab Spring protests quickly escalated into one of the most destructive conflicts of the 21st century.

Millions of Syrians have been internally displaced, and approximately 6 million have fled the country. The majority went to neighboring countries such as Türkiye, Jordan and Lebanon, but just over a million people fled to Europe.

European countries are currently struggling with how to respond to the changing environment in Syria. Germany and Austria are holding off on processing asylum applications from Syrians. The international law principle of non-refoulement prohibits countries from returning refugees to dangerous environments where they may be exposed to persecution or violence.

However, people can choose to return on their own. And the fall of the Assad regime changed refugees' perceptions of safety and possibility.

In fact, a United Nations Refugee Agency survey conducted in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt in January 2025 found that 80% of Syrian refugees wanted to return home, a significant increase from 57% the previous year. But hope and reality do not always align, and the factors motivating return are far more complex than changes in political authority.

Why do people keep coming back?

In most post-conflict settings, voluntary repatriation begins only after security has improved, schools have reopened, basic infrastructure has been restored, and housing has been rebuilt. Still, people often return to their home countries but not to their original communities, especially when local political control changes or recovery is incomplete.

In Syria, violence continues in several regions, governance is divided, and sectarian tensions persist. Yet refugees are coming back anyway.

The main factor is the deteriorating situation in the neighboring host country. Most of those who returned to Syria in the early months after Assad's fall came from neighboring countries that had hosted large numbers of refugees for more than a decade and are now suffering from economic crisis, political tensions and reduced aid.

Turkey, for example, has seen an increase in forced returns of Syrians who face growing structural barriers to integration, such as temporary status without the possibility of naturalization and strict local registration policies.

Meanwhile, in Lebanon, recent violence and a significant drop in international aid have left Syrian refugees unable to secure food, education and health care.

And in Jordan, the daily lives of refugees are becoming more precarious due to cuts in international humanitarian aid.

In other words, many Syrians are returning not because their homeland has become safer, but because the places they have fled have become more difficult.

There is no data on the religious or ethnic composition of returnees. However, patterns from other post-conflict contexts suggest that returnees are usually from majority communities aligned with the new dominant political actors. For example, after the Kosovo war, Albanians returned quickly, but Serb and Roma minorities returned in far smaller numbers due to insecurity and threats of retaliation.

If Syria continues on this trajectory, more Sunni Muslims could return as the country's president, Ahmed al-Shara, led the Sunni rebel coalition that toppled Assad.

Syria's ethnic minorities, including Alawites, Christians, Druze, and Kurds, may avoid returning completely. Violence targeting minority communities underscores continued instability. Recent attacks against the Alawite population have triggered a new wave of displacement into Lebanon, while conflict between Druze militias and the government in Suweida, southern Syria, has led to further internal displacement. These episodes show that while parts of the country may feel safe to some, instability continues.

Barriers to returns

One of the biggest obstacles faced by refugees wishing to return home is the state of their homes and property rights.

The civil war caused widespread destruction of homes, businesses, and public buildings.

Land administration systems, including registry offices and records, were damaged or destroyed. This is important because refugee return requires more than physical safety. People need a place to live and a place to prove that the home they return to is legally theirs.

An analysis by conflict monitoring group ACLED of more than 140,000 qualitative reports of violent incidents between 2014 and 2025 shows that property-related destruction is concentrated in inland provinces rather than coastal areas, with cities such as Aleppo, Idlib and Homs hardest hit.

This has a big impact on where you can make a comeback and where you stall. With documents lost, homes reoccupied and records destroyed, many Syrians are at risk of legal uncertainty and relapse into direct and sometimes violent conflict over land and housing.

Post-conflict reconstruction requires not only rebuilding physical infrastructure, but also restoring land governance, including property verification, dispute resolution, and compensation mechanisms. Without all of this, the return of refugees could be delayed as people face uncertainty about whether they will be able to regain their homes.

shaping syria

Whether the wave of returns continues through 2025 or remains a temporary surge will depend on three main criteria: the security situation in Syria, the rebuilding of housing and land management systems, and the policies of the countries hosting Syrian refugees.

But ultimately, a year after the end of the war, Syrians are returning with a mix of hope and hardship. They face the hope that the fall of the Assad regime has opened a path to their homeland, and the challenges of declining support and security in neighboring countries.

Whether these returns are safe, voluntary and sustainable is a key question that will shape Syria's recovery in the coming years.

Sandra Joyleman, Weinstein Director of International Studies and Professor of Political Science; University of Richmond

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.